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KOLKER v. GORN
EFFECT OF QUALIFYING WORDS IN DEED TO
HUSBAND, WIFE AND THIRD PARTY
Kolker v. Gorn'
Plaintiff obtained a judgment by default against defen-
dant Samuel G. Gorn in September 1944 and in August
1948 obtained a writ of fieri facias on the judgment which
was levied upon the defendant's property. The defendant
filed a motion to quash asserting that his only interest in
the property was a half-interest with his wife as tenants
by the entireties; and his wife, Margaret A. Gorn filed her
claim to the property seized on the same ground. A deed
to the property showed that it had been conveyed to "John
M. Gorn, Samuel G. Gorn and Margaret A. Gorn, his wife,
as joint tenants, and not as tenants in common their assigns,
the survivors or survivor of them, and the survivors' or sur-
vivor's heirs and assigns, in fee simple". John M. Gorn is
the father of Samuel G. Gorn. Over the objection of the
plaintiff, testimony was offered at the hearing to show that
Samuel G. Gorn purchased the property with money sup-
plied by his father, that the three parties contributed to-
wards the cost of the building, that the property was to be
owned one-half by the father and one-half by the son and
the son's wife, and that payments on the mortgage and
household expenses were shared by the father and son.
Margaret A. Gorn testified, also over objection, that she
had contributed to the cost of the building and that she
understood that her father-in-law owned one-half and that
she and her husband owned the other half. The Superior
Court of Baltimore City granted the defendant's motion to
quash and sustained the claim of the defendant's wife.
From this order plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals
affirmed this judgment.
The case was argued upon two questions:
"(1) Whether upon the face of the deed the interest of
appellee is a half-interest as tenants by the entire-
ties with his wife, or a one-third interest as joint
tenant, and
(2) Whether the testimony is admissible to show the
true intention of the parties."2
167 A. 2d 258 (Md., 1949).
2 IUd, 260.
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Concerning the first issue involved the Court stated that
at common law a husband and wife could hold property in
no other way than by tenants by entireties, and that this
type of ownership has been recognized in Maryland for a
long period.4 The difficulty in this particular situation was
whether the words "as joint tenants, and not as tenants in
common" in the deed to the defendant rebutted the pre-
sumption inferred by the words "his wife" following the
name of Margaret A. Gorn. The Court pointed out that a
conveyance to a husband and wife without any qualifying
or restrictive words creates a presumption of tenancy by
the entireties in Maryland and elsewhere,5 but stated that
there is a conflict in situations where the words used in the
conveyance to husband and wife are "as joint tenants, and
not as tenants in common", and that in some jurisdictions
these words are sufficient to rebut the presumption of ten-
ancy by entireties.6 The Court followed this latter reason-
ing citing Fladung v. Rose,7 and admitted that this view
probably represented the minority." "Nevertheless", the
Court said, "it was followed and approved after full con-
sideration in Wolf v. Johnson.9 We accept it as settled law
in this jurisdiction."1
Thus, the Court held that the use of the words "joint
tenants" rebutted the presumption of the common law that
a conveyance to a husband and wife, even where qualifying
words are used, creates tenancy by the entireties.
Next the Court considered the problem that was
squarely presented in the instant case, the inclusion of a
stranger with the husband and wife as grantees. The
opinion stated: "Where the conveyance is to husband and
wife and a stranger, without qualifying words, it is the
common-law rule that husband and wife take one-half as
34 KENT, COmmENTARIS (14th Ed.) 363; 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES,
182.
'Craft v. Wilcox, 4 Gill 504 (1846) ; Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402 (1878).
Brewer v. Bowersox, 92 Md. 567, 572, 48 A. 1060 (1901) ; 161 A. L. R. 457,
466-7, citing Wolf v. Johnson, 157 Md. 112, 145 A. 363 (1929) and Hammond
v. Dugan, 166 Md. 402, 170 A. 757 (1934).
' 161 A. L. R. 457, 469470 citing Hannan v. Towers, 3 Harr. & J. 147 (1810)
and Fladung v. Rose, 58 Md. 13 (1882).
*58 Md. 13 (1882).
*161 A. L. R. 457, 471 "A conveyance of property to husband and wife
expressly as 'joint tenants' has been held in a number of cases to make
them tenants by entireties. The argument advanced for this theory usually
is that the entirety estate is but a form of joint tenancy with peculiar in-
cidents." (This represents the majority view.)
' 157 Md. 112, 145 A. 363 (1929). See also Annapolis Banking & Trust Co.
v. Neilson, 164 Md. 8, 164 A. 157 (1933) and Young v. Cockman, 182 Md. 246,
251, 34 A. 2d 428, 149 A. L. R. 1006 (1943).
10 Supra, n. 1, 260-261. (Emphasis suppled.)
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tenants by the entireties and the third party takes the other
half as tenant in common.""' The problem here revolved
around the use of qualifying words. The appellee argued
that the use of qualifying words in a case where a stranger
is included can be given effect between the husband and
wife as a unit and the third party stranger, thus giving the
husband and wife as a unit a tenancy by entireties in one-
half with the other half held by the third party as a joint
tenant. However, the Court did not follow this reasoning,
stating:
"'This tenancy (by the entireties) may be created
even when the husband and wife are not the only
grantees in the conveyance..., as when it is to a man
and his wife and another person, in which case the
husband and wife would, prima facie, take a one-half
interest only, which they would hold by entireties,
while the third person would take the other half;...
This rule, however, that the husband and wife take
together but one share, like the rule that they take as
tenants by entireties, is, it appears merely a rule of
construction, and must give way to evidence of a con-
trary intention'." 2
Evidence of a contrary intent would be the inclusion of
these qualifying words importing joint tenancy.
The Court could find only one case in point.'" This case
turned upon the construction placed upon the instrument
by the parties, and could not be strongly relied upon here
except that the court in that case had looked to the intent
of the parties. Thus in the absence of a contrary intent by
the parties the Court held:
"Since we have held that the use of the words 'joint
tenants' rebuts the presumption arising from the word
'wife', or the fact that the grantees are husband and
wife, we find no basis in the language itself for sever-
ing the tenancy into two different types. The qualify-
ing words seem clearly applicable to all three parties,
and their respective 'survivors or survivor'." 4
Supra, n. 1, 261. (Emphasis supplied.) See also Haid v. Haid, 167 Md.
493, 175 A. 338 (1934) ; Bartholomew v. Marshall, 257 App. Div. 1060, 13
N. Y. S. 2d 568 (1939) ; and also Tizer v. Tizer, 162 Md. 489, 492, 160 A. 163,
161 A. 510 (1932) and Baker v. Baker, 123 Md. 32, 90 A. 776 (1914).
SSupra, n. 1, 261, citing TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd Ed.), Sec. 431,
p. 221.
Mosser v. Dolsay, 132 N. J. Eq. 121, 27 A. 2d 155 (1942).
u Supra, n. 1, 261.
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The Court thus answered the first issue involved to the
effect that upon the face of the deed the interest of the
appellee is a one-third interest as a joint tenant.
The case hinged, therefore, upon whether the appellee's
testimony was admissible to show the true intention of the
parties. The Court stated that as far as a bona fide pur-
chaser would be concerned no such intention could be
shown,15 but ruled that a judgment creditor is not in the
same position as a bona fide purchaser and that the former's
claim is subject to prior, undisclosed equities. "'He (a
judgment creditor) is neither in fact nor in law a bona fide
purchaser, and must stand or fall by the real, and not the
apparent rights of the defendant in the judgment'."'6 The
opinion then pointed out that in equity a deed may be re-
formed on the ground of mutual mistake as to legal effect
of words in order to conform to the real intention of the
parties, 7 and that while this was an action at law, such
reformation was permissible when attachment and execu-
tion proceedings are concerned because equitable defenses
are available where the real ownership is involved."' In
concluding upon the question of admissibility of the evi-
dence the Court of Appeals stated:
"We think an execution creditor, who is a stranger
to the transaction and stands in the shoes of the debtor
subject to all outstanding equities, cannot invoke the
parol evidence rule to prevent a party to the deed from
showing a mutual mistake by the parties, in the absence
of facts raising an estoppel."'
In conclusion this case would appear to set out the fol-
lowing rules concerning words of qualification where a
grant to a husband and wife are involved.
(1) Where the grant is to a husband and wife and there
are no qualifying words, the husband and wife are
presumed to take as tenants by the entireties. This
3 Campbell v. Lowe, 9 Md. 500, 507 (1856).
Supra, n. 1, 261. (Emphasis supplied.) Citing Ahern v. White, 39 Md.
409, 420 (1874) ; Lee v. Keech, 151 Md. 34, 37, 133 A. 835, 46 A. L. R. 1488
(1926) ; Caltrider v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 397, 153 A. 445, 87 A. L. R. 1500
(1931) ; 1 GL-ENN, FRAUDULXNT CONVEYANCES (Rev. Ed. 1940), Sec. 19.
17 Scott v. Grow, 301 Mich. 226, 3 N. W. 2d 254 (1942), note 141 A. L. R.
826, 840. RKsTATE ENT, REs TruTTON, Sec. 51(a) (Illustration 3); 5
WTILISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed.), Sec. 1585; Cooke v. Husbands, 11 Md.
492, 511 (1857).
I f. Frantz v. Lane, 169 Md. 703 (unreported), .182 A. 337 (1936) ; Haid
v. Baid, 167 Md. 493, 175 A. 338 (1934) ; Lemp Brewing Co. v. Mantz, 120
Md. 176, 183, 87 A. 814 (1913).
" Supra, n. 1, 262.
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represents the Maryland view and also the ma-
jority of American jurisdictions.
(2) Where the grant is to a husband and wife and
there are qualifying words, the husband and wife
do not take as tenants by the entireties, the qualify-
ing words overruling the presumption to the con-
trary. This represents the Maryland view, but is
in the minority in other American jurisdictions.
(3) Where the grant is to a husband and wife and a
third party stranger and there are no qualifying
words, the husband and wife take one-half as
tenants by the entireties and the third party takes
the other half as tenants in common. This is the
Maryland view and probable weight of authority
in American jurisdictions.
(4) Where the grant is to a husband and wife and a
third party stranger and there are qualifying
words, the husband and wife do not take as tenants
by the entireties but take as individuals subject to
the qualifying words in the absence of a clear con-
trary intent. This is the Maryland view (repre-
sented by this case) but is probably the minority
view in other American jurisdictions.
INSURANCE - ISOLATED INSTANCE OF CARRYING
FOR HIRE NOT "PUBLIC OR LIVERY CON-
VEYANCE" WITHIN POLICY EXCLUSION
Stanley v. American Motorists Ins. Co.1
Appellee issued a policy of insurance to Pfeiffer, apply-
ing to a truck owned by him, which contained the following
exclusion clause:
"This policy does not apply (a) while the automo-
bile is used as a public or livery conveyance, unless
such use is specifically described in ihe policy and
premium charged therefore."
173 A. 2d 1 (Md., 1950).
